Shape the cybersecurity workshare.
Review solicitation requirements, identify deliverables and dependencies, define assumptions and contribute a scoped technical approach.
FOR PRIME CONTRACTORS / OT CYBERSECURITY
Protect the control system.
Move the authorization forward.
Bring SOS onto your team for OT cybersecurity, RMF/ATO, and Continuous Authorization / Continuous RMF. Connect live technical telemetry to NIST 800-53 controls, POA&M status, and current authorization evidence throughout operations.
A SPECIALIST WORKSTREAM ON YOUR TEAM
Your engineering scope. Our cybersecurity focus.
For engineering, construction and systems-integration primes that need dedicated cybersecurity expertise alongside their control-system delivery.
Connect design to controls.
Document boundaries and interfaces, assign control responsibilities, and coordinate implementation evidence with the integrator and system owner.
Maintain control evidence through operations.
Link technical observations to control review, POA&M status, evidence refresh, and authorization-package changes throughout the system lifecycle.
DEFINED OUTPUTS / REVIEWABLE WORK
Deliverables you can scope into a subcontract.
Select a focused task or a coordinated workstream. Final outputs, responsibilities and acceptance criteria are agreed for each engagement.
| Workstream | Typical outputs | Coordination needed |
|---|---|---|
| Boundary & system characterization | Asset and interface inventories; boundary and data-flow diagrams; system-description and categorization inputs. | Operators, integrator, system owner and available design records. |
| Control implementation & design review | Control responsibility matrix; implementation narratives; access, segmentation, transfer and logging recommendations; documented constraints. | Applicable baseline, agency requirements, vendor capabilities and approved design decisions. |
| SSP & authorization-package support | SSP contributions; supporting policies and procedures; evidence index; eMASS documentation and update support where authorized. | Package owner, authorized access, reviewer expectations and required templates. |
| Assessment preparation & remediation | Evidence readiness review; test coordination inputs; findings register; draft POA&M and corrective-action tracking. | Assessment team, operational approvals, maintenance windows and responsible owners. |
| Continuous Authorization / Continuous RMF | Telemetry-to-control mappings; POA&M status and aging; evidence refresh; significant-change review; SSP/eMASS updates and authorization reporting. | Approved telemetry sources, system/control owners, operational constraints, agency monitoring strategy, and authorization decision authority. |
SOS supports the authorization process. The government authorizing official makes the authorization decision; an ATO outcome or timeline is not guaranteed.
CONTINUOUS AUTHORIZATION / CONTINUOUS RMF
Connect live signals to the authorization record.
Keep the RMF lifecycle active after the initial ATO. SOS connects available technical telemetry to applicable NIST SP 800-53 controls, POA&M status, and authorization evidence through scoped integrations and an agreed review cadence.
Collect the right signals.
Use approved identity, endpoint, cloud, configuration, vulnerability, and passive OT sources. Track source coverage, asset scope, collection time, and visibility gaps.
Map signals to control review.
Associate observations with the affected component, control requirement, implementation narrative, and evidence reference. Assign review and corrective-action owners.
Keep decisions and evidence current.
Update POA&M aging, remediation status, risk records, SSP changes, and eMASS artifacts where authorized. Escalate significant changes for assessment and authorization review.
| Technical observation | Example control review | POA&M / authorization evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Identity and privileged-access events | IA-2, AC-2, AC-6: authentication coverage, account lifecycle, and task privileges. | Account review, approved exceptions, access-test records, and assigned corrective actions. |
| Configuration drift and IaC changes | CM-2, CM-3, CM-6: approved baseline, change review, and secure settings. | Versioned deployment/change records, deviations, remediation status, and SSP impact. |
| Vulnerability and patch observations | RA-5, SI-2: review scope, exposure, approved remediation, and operational limits. | Finding owner, POA&M milestones and aging, validated closure, or required risk decision. |
| SIEM and passive OT detections | SI-4, AU-6, IR-4, CA-7: visibility, analysis, response, and monitoring strategy. | Source coverage, triage and response records, evidence refresh, and significant-change review. |
These are illustrative mappings, not automated MET findings. Telemetry supports assessment and risk review; it does not prove every control objective. The authorizing official retains authorization decisions, and agency policy determines the ongoing-authorization approach. OT collection and testing remain coordinated with operators and vendors.
Related delivery foundations: GCC High / Azure Government virtualization and AVD isolation, IaC repeatability, OT / specialized-asset integration, and assessment expertise.
OT CONSTRAINTS / PRACTICAL DESIGN
Account for the equipment and the mission.
Microgrids, utilities & SCADA
Scope the controllers, supervisory systems, engineering stations, vendor connections and IT interfaces. Coordinate cybersecurity work with commissioning and operational requirements.
Building & facility controls
Align the cybersecurity workstream with design and construction requirements for facility-related control systems and the applicable service-specific criteria.
Industrial & specialized equipment
Account for legacy operating systems, limited patching options, removable media and equipment that cannot support standard enterprise safeguards.
Operationally coordinated testing
Confirm vendor guidance, operator approval and recovery arrangements before active scanning or changes. Define evidence collection that fits the system’s operating constraints.
CONTROLLED HANDOFF / ARCHITECTURE EXAMPLE
Make every trust boundary explicit.
One SOS design pattern connects a managed engineering endpoint to isolated OT or specialized equipment through a defined transfer process. Access, media handling, malware checks, custody and residual risks are documented against the equipment’s actual capabilities.
This pattern can inform a boundary discussion. It does not replace a project-specific RMF design or establish compliance by itself.
Explore SOS enclave design patterns ↗ILLUSTRATIVE PATTERN / NOT A CLIENT CASE STUDY
MANAGED WORKSPACEApproved engineering endpointIdentity · configuration · monitoring
↓ Defined transfer boundary ↓
CONTROLLED HANDOFFAuthorized transfer procedureMedia compatibility · checks · custody
↓ Equipment-specific constraints ↓
ISOLATED EQUIPMENTOT / specialized assetOperator procedures · physical safeguards
CONTRACT-ALIGNED DELIVERY
Start with the applicable requirements.
Our proposed approach follows the solicitation, system owner’s direction and agreed responsibilities. Confirm referenced editions, tailoring and service-specific requirements before defining the scope.
DoD RMF & security controls
DoDI 8510.01, the applicable NIST SP 800-53 baseline and agency procedures frame the authorization workstream.
DoD RMF guidance ↗OT security considerations
NIST SP 800-82 informs OT security decisions that account for performance, reliability and safety.
NIST OT guidance ↗Facility control-system criteria
UFC 4-010-06 and UFGS 25 05 11 are relevant to facility-related control-system work when incorporated into the project requirements.
UFC criteria ↗UFGS specification ↗SEE THE WORK PRODUCT / FICTIONAL EXAMPLE
From a boundary decision to reviewable evidence.
Preview how SOS can structure an OT/RMF workstream. This 26-page example connects seven protection layers and ten OT components to 43 control references, implementation mechanisms, candidate tools and validation steps.
Fictional OT-DEMO-001. No client data, completed assessment or authorization outcome is represented.
Preview the sample control-to-evidence matrix
Every row is Not validated. This is an illustrative subset, not a selected baseline. Confirm enhancements, organization-defined parameters and responsibility assignments for the actual project.
| Control | Mechanism / candidate tools | Evidence / validation | Accountable role / components |
|---|---|---|---|
| SC-7Boundary Protection | Separate enterprise, OT DMZ, supervisory and controller zones. Default-deny inter-zone paths; approve each source, destination, service and business purpose. Separate firewall management from production control traffic.Tool / technique: Industrial-aware firewall, e.g. FortiGate; controlled ACL/rule exports | EV-02Compare approved F01-F08 flows with device rules; evaluate an unauthorized path in an approved test environment. | Network ownerC01 perimeter; C02 DMZ; C06 field conduits |
| AC-4Information Flow Enforcement | Enforce approved information flows across zones, including vendor access, process data and media imports. A VLAN alone is not a security decision point; document and enforce the conduit.Tool / technique: Firewall allowlists, application-aware policies, transfer procedures | EV-02, EV-10Trace representative allowed and prohibited flows; verify devices and bypass paths against the flow register. | Network / system ownerC01-C06 conduits; C09 transfers |
| AC-17Remote Access | Permit remote access only through the approved gateway and broker, with explicit authorization, time limits and termination. No direct vendor route to controllers; remote access is optional, not assumed necessary.Tool / technique: Approved VPN/access gateway, PAM/session broker, maintenance ticket | EV-03, EV-04Verify gateway-only entry, session scope, approval, expiry and emergency revocation under approved conditions. | Access owner / operatorC01 access gateway; C02 jump broker |
| SC-8Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity | Protect transmission confidentiality and integrity where required and supported. Use approved authenticated encryption at capable endpoints; identify unprotected legacy segments and unresolved requirements explicitly.Tool / technique: Approved TLS/IPsec profiles; signed/authenticated industrial protocol modes where supported | EV-02Validate endpoint settings, trust and protocol support; document any plaintext segment and residual-risk decision. | Network / application ownerC01 gateway; C03/C04 capable hosts; C07 log relay |
| SC-13Cryptographic Protection | Select cryptographic protection required by the contract and data. Where validated cryptography is required, verify the exact module, version, operating mode and validation status rather than the product name alone.Tool / technique: Required validated crypto modules, protected key stores, approved encryption configuration | EV-02, EV-08, EV-10Review applicable crypto requirements, actual configuration and module evidence; record unsupported asset gaps. | Security / cryptography ownerC01 secure access; C08 backup; C09 media |
| AC-2Account Management | Maintain named accounts, approved roles, provisioning and disabling procedures. Document unavoidable local/service accounts with owners and review actions. Separate routine operation from privileged administration.Tool / technique: Directory/identity service, account inventory, approval workflow | EV-03Reconcile active accounts to approvals and role needs; test disabling a sample account in a safe environment. | Account administratorC02 broker; C03 engineering; C04 HMI; C07 monitoring |
| AC-3Access Enforcement | Configure application and device permissions around the approved access model. Limit programming, configuration, alarm handling and read-only access according to operational duties.Tool / technique: Native device roles, RBAC, access lists and permission exports | EV-03, EV-04Verify role-to-function enforcement using approved test accounts; identify coarse or missing device permissions. | System / application ownerC02-C06 access-capable components |
| AC-6Least Privilege | Use separate administrative identities and least-privilege duties. Grant privileged sessions only for approved tasks; restrict shared credentials and document any legacy limitation.Tool / technique: PAM/credential vault, native roles, controlled elevation and review records | EV-04Review privileged memberships, task scope and session records; verify removal of unnecessary privileges. | Access ownerC02 privileged broker; C03 engineering; C05 infrastructure |
| IA-2Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Identify and authenticate organizational users uniquely. Where selected enhancements require MFA, enforce it at capable access points; specifically evaluate IA-2(1) and IA-2(2) applicability. Gateway MFA does not automatically close downstream gaps.Tool / technique: Approved identity service and MFA; device/application authentication | EV-03Confirm unique identities and selected MFA enhancement coverage; test denied access without the required factors. | Identity ownerC01 gateway; C02 broker; C03/C04 capable hosts |
| IA-5Authenticator Management | Manage credential issuance, change, protection and revocation. Replace defaults where possible; protect service secrets and document vendor-dependent credentials that cannot be changed.Tool / technique: Credential vault, native password/key settings, rotation and exception records | EV-03, EV-04Review default credentials, secret storage and lifecycle evidence; validate changes with vendor/operator approval. | Identity / asset ownerC01-C07 authenticators and service credentials |
| IA-8Identification and Authentication (Non-organizational Users) | Identify and authenticate external users under the applicable policy. Assign accountable identities, approved access periods and sponsor responsibilities; evaluate federation and account handling requirements.Tool / technique: Approved external identity workflow, gateway authentication, vendor access register | EV-03, EV-12Reconcile vendor identities and sponsors; verify expired external access is disabled and traceable. | Access owner / supplier leadC01/C02 vendor and other non-organizational access |
| CM-8System Component Inventory | Build a versioned hardware/software inventory with roles, zones, owners, supported versions and interfaces. Include controllers, field devices, network equipment, removable-media and recovery dependencies.Tool / technique: Passive OT discovery, integrator records, controlled asset register | EV-01, EV-06Reconcile passive observations and engineering records; investigate missing, duplicate or unknown devices safely. | Asset owner / controls integratorC01-C10 all scoped assets and dependencies |
| CM-2Baseline Configuration | Establish approved baselines for capable hosts, network equipment and controller logic/projects. Preserve configuration provenance and restoration dependencies; keep authorization-significant changes traceable.Tool / technique: Vendor engineering tools, controlled configuration repository, baseline index | EV-05Compare representative live versions/settings with approved records; document drift without unapproved changes. | Configuration ownerC01-C10 configurations and controller projects |
| CM-3Configuration Change Control | Review and authorize configuration and logic changes, including impact, testing, rollback, evidence and package updates. Coordinate implementation with the operator and system owner.Tool / technique: Change workflow, version control, vendor test environment, rollback checklist | EV-05Trace one proposed change through approval, testing, baseline update and post-change validation. | Change authority / operatorC01-C10 changes affecting operation or security |
| CM-6Configuration Settings | Apply approved secure settings and applicable STIG guidance where relevant and supported. Tailor and document deviations instead of assuming all enterprise settings are safe on OT components.Tool / technique: Native configuration tools; approved SCAP/STIG review on compatible systems | EV-05Validate settings and documented deviations; confirm operational tests and approvals before enforcement. | Configuration / asset ownerC01-C07 configurable systems |
| CM-7Least Functionality | Disable unnecessary services, accounts, interfaces and functions after dependency review. Restrict engineering tools and protocol functions to the users and equipment that require them.Tool / technique: Service/port inventory, native configuration, allowlisting where approved | EV-05Check exposed functions against operating needs; verify vendor/mission dependencies before removal. | System / asset ownerC01-C07 services and functions |
| RA-3Risk Assessment | Assess mission, safety, availability and data risks with operators and engineering leads. Record threat paths, asset constraints, likelihood/impact rationale and authorized risk decisions.Tool / technique: Risk workshop, threat-path review, documented risk register | EV-12Verify risk rationale, owner and decision authority; ensure legacy limitations and third-party dependencies are addressed. | System owner / risk leadWhole OT system and external dependencies |
| RA-5Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning | Use a planned review method matched to device tolerance. Combine inventory, vendor advisories and passive observations; perform active scanning only when approved and tested for the actual component and process state.Tool / technique: Passive OT sensor; vendor advisories; approved scanner on compatible assets | EV-06Check scope, approvals, limitations and finding disposition; do not use an unapproved live scan as a validation step. | Vulnerability lead / operatorC01-C10 assets; C06 controllers with special constraints |
| SI-2Flaw Remediation | Evaluate flaws and available vendor fixes. Test updates and rollback in a representative environment, schedule approved maintenance, and track deferrals and unresolved vulnerabilities explicitly.Tool / technique: Vendor patch tools, staged repository, ticketed remediation and exception register | EV-06Trace a finding to tested update or documented risk treatment; confirm versions and operational checks. | Patch / asset ownerC01-C07 firmware/software; C06 vendor-dependent devices |
| SI-3Malicious Code Protection | Use approved malware protection on compatible hosts and scan incoming files at the controlled transfer station. Confirm exclusions and performance with operators; do not imply agents can be installed on every controller.Tool / technique: Vendor-approved endpoint protection/EDR, e.g. Defender for Endpoint on supported hosts | EV-05, EV-10Review coverage and exclusions; verify a benign approved test file is handled without affecting production equipment. | Endpoint / media ownerC02-C04 supported hosts; C09 transfer station |
| SI-4System Monitoring | Monitor selected traffic and events for abnormal behavior. Baseline expected assets and protocols; tune alerts with operators and define escalation without automatic process intervention unless authorized.Tool / technique: SPAN/TAP sensor, e.g. Defender for IoT; SIEM and operator review | EV-07Confirm visibility across intended conduits, sensor health and alert ownership; test using approved replay/test data. | Monitoring lead / operatorC07 passive sensors, log relay and monitoring |
| SI-7Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity | Check software/firmware and configuration integrity using supported signatures, approved hashes or version comparisons. Document devices that lack verification and the remaining uncertainty.Tool / technique: Vendor signature utilities, controlled hashes, signed-package verification | EV-05, EV-08Compare a staged update or project file to its approved source; validate supported integrity checks before deployment. | Configuration / vendor leadC03 engineering projects; C06 firmware; C08 recovery copies |
| AU-2Event Logging | Select auditable events with operational and security stakeholders. Define events for remote access, administrative changes, engineering actions and security incidents; record devices that cannot generate them.Tool / technique: Event-source inventory, logging requirements, native audit configuration | EV-07Compare selected events with component capabilities and collection coverage; review gaps and approved alternatives. | Monitoring / system ownerC01-C07 audit-capable sources |
| AU-6Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting | Review and correlate selected records against expected behavior. Assign analyst and operator responsibilities, review intervals and escalation; retain disposition and investigation evidence.Tool / technique: SIEM correlation, e.g. Sentinel where permitted; analyst runbooks and case workflow | EV-07, EV-09Walk through an approved sample event from collection to analyst review, operator coordination and disposition. | Monitoring leadC07 monitoring and operator escalation |
| AU-8Time Stamps | Use approved time sources for capable devices; record time zones, drift and unsupported clocks. Protect time-service access and account for timestamp limitations during incident reconstruction.Tool / technique: Approved internal time service, native time configuration, drift review | EV-07Compare timestamps and synchronization records; document discrepancies that affect event sequencing. | Infrastructure / time ownerC01-C07 timestamp-capable components |
| AU-9Protection of Audit Information | Restrict audit access and administrative changes; protect retained records from unauthorized modification or deletion. Separate routine analysts from log-platform administrators where practical.Tool / technique: Restricted log roles, protected retention storage, access/change audit trails | EV-07Review access and retention configuration; verify protection and record unauthorized-change test outcomes safely. | Evidence / monitoring ownerC07 log store; C08 evidence repository |
| AU-12Audit Record Generation | Configure generation of the selected event records on scoped components. Validate the event fields, device source and export path; retain limitations rather than marking silent devices covered.Tool / technique: Native audit settings, relay configuration and representative event samples | EV-07Generate approved benign actions on test-capable components; verify records at source and collector. | Asset / monitoring ownerC01-C07 audit-capable components |
| IR-4Incident Handling | Use an OT-specific handling process with operator coordination, containment decisions, evidence preservation and recovery approval. Do not automatically isolate a live controller without authorized operational direction.Tool / technique: Incident runbook, case workflow, approved containment decision tree | EV-09Run a tabletop using a simulated unauthorized vendor session; confirm authority, communications and evidence handling. | Incident lead / operatorC07 monitoring; C03-C06 operational response interfaces |
| IR-8Incident Response Plan | Maintain an incident plan covering roles, contacts, reporting obligations, vendor support, operator actions and plan review. Define how cybersecurity incidents intersect with safety and emergency procedures.Tool / technique: Versioned incident plan, contact roster and exercise records | EV-09Review plan approval, contact currency, notification obligations and lessons from the tabletop. | Incident lead / system ownerWhole system incident planning and external coordination |
| CP-2Contingency Plan | Define priority functions, dependencies, disruption tolerances and recovery order with the system owner. Coordinate cyber recovery with operational continuity and separately managed safety functions.Tool / technique: Contingency plan, dependency map, operating procedures | EV-08, EV-09Check recovery priorities and approval roles against mission constraints and equipment dependencies. | Continuity / operator leadC03-C06 mission operations; C08 recovery |
| CP-4Contingency Plan Testing | Exercise the contingency plan under approved conditions. Use representative restoration tests and tabletop scenarios before scheduling any test that could affect a live process.Tool / technique: Isolated restore environment, exercise plan and operator-approved test procedure | EV-08Observe a safe restore exercise, record results and corrective actions; do not infer production recovery from file existence. | Continuity / operator leadC08 recovery copies and representative test environment |
| CP-9System Backup | Back up required system information, engineering projects, configurations and recovery dependencies. Protect access and copies; align retention, frequency and offline/immutable copy decisions with approved recovery needs.Tool / technique: Approved backup platform, controller project exports, protected/offline copies | EV-08Review copy scope and integrity; reconcile backups with the approved configuration and recovery requirements. | Backup / configuration ownerC03-C06 configurations; C08 backup repository |
| CP-10System Recovery and Reconstitution | Document system recovery and reconstitution, including known-good versions, configuration/logic restoration, operator checks and permission to return to service. Identify irreplaceable hardware or licenses.Tool / technique: Recovery runbook, vendor recovery tools, known-good baseline and spare plan | EV-08Validate documented prerequisites and safe restoration sequence; retain operator-approved return-to-service criteria. | Recovery / operator leadC03-C06 recovery sequencing |
| MA-4Nonlocal Maintenance | Control nonlocal maintenance through approved sessions, authorizations and personnel. Record activity and disconnect when complete; evaluate maintenance tools, data paths and personnel requirements.Tool / technique: Brokered maintenance session, approved ticket, vendor-specific tools | EV-04, EV-10Review maintenance approval, session evidence and termination; confirm no standing uncontrolled device connection. | Maintenance lead / operatorC01/C02 remote maintenance; C06 vendor support |
| MP-5Media Transport | Authorize and document media transport, custody, storage and required protection. Match safeguards to information sensitivity and equipment compatibility; record unresolved requirements instead of claiming an air gap is sufficient.Tool / technique: Approved protected media, custody log, storage and transport procedure | EV-10Review a fictional media handoff record, approved protection, destination and custody responsibilities. | Media custodianC09 removable media / offline handoff |
| MP-7Media Use | Restrict media types and authorized users. Use a controlled transfer station, scan files, approve destination and retain transfer records; disable other media interfaces where safe and supported.Tool / technique: Device control on compatible hosts, transfer station, allowlist and operator checklist | EV-10Verify the approved transfer workflow on test equipment; review prohibited paths, exceptions and file approval evidence. | Media / asset ownerC09 media use on engineering and field assets |
| PE-2Physical Access Authorizations | Maintain approved physical-access authorizations for relevant locations. Reconcile employees, vendors and maintenance personnel to operational duties and escort requirements.Tool / technique: Badge/access register, visitor sponsorship and periodic review | EV-11Review current authorization lists and revocations; confirm responsibilities for shared facilities. | Facility / system ownerC10 facility, cabinets, consoles and media stores |
| PE-3Physical Access Control | Enforce physical access at relevant entrances, cabinets and console areas; supervise visitors and protect exposed programming/media ports. Define shared-space limitations and response.Tool / technique: Locks/cabinets, access-control systems, escorts and access records | EV-11Inspect approved access measures and a sample visitor procedure without exposing real site security details. | Facility security / operatorC10 facility and control equipment access |
| PL-2System Security and Privacy Plans | Document the system, connections, applicable controls, roles and dependencies in the SSP. Keep diagrams, component records, narratives and inherited/external responsibilities consistent.Tool / technique: SSP template, responsibility matrix, versioned architecture/evidence index | EV-01, EV-12Reconcile sample components, flows, controls and record IDs; identify missing scope and approval decisions. | System owner / package leadWhole boundary and implementation responsibilities |
| CA-2Control Assessments | Plan an assessment against applicable requirements with authorized scope and methods. Separate evidence preparation from independent findings and record component-specific limits.Tool / technique: Assessment plan, interview/examine/test procedures and finding workflow | EV-12Confirm authorized assessor roles, approved methods and evidence sufficiency; this sample makes no assessment finding. | Assessment authority / system ownerWhole scoped implementation and assessment coordination |
| CA-7Continuous Monitoring | Set a monitoring strategy that tracks control status, changes, vulnerabilities, risk and evidence refresh. Tie reporting to owners and authorization-significant changes.Tool / technique: ConMon plan, evidence register, configuration/vulnerability dashboards | EV-06, EV-07, EV-12Review planned frequency and actual evidence once implemented; reconcile findings, aging and scope changes. | System owner / monitoring leadC01-C10 recurring assurance and operating changes |
| SA-9External System Services | Define external service requirements, connections, responsibilities and available assurance evidence. Do not assume a commercial/cloud service is authorized or that its controls are inherited automatically.Tool / technique: Service agreement, boundary/connection review, responsibility and evidence matrix | EV-12Validate service suitability and allocation for the actual system; record missing assurance or government approvals. | Service / system ownerExternal identity, monitoring, backup or vendor services |
| SR-3Supply Chain Controls and Processes | Define supply-chain safeguards for procurement, delivery, updates, support and end-of-life. Track provenance and supportability; review critical supplier dependencies and change notifications.Tool / technique: Supplier review, provenance/receiving records, lifecycle and support register | EV-12Review supplier safeguards and evidence for a sample component; confirm support and patch provenance expectations. | Supplier / system ownerC01-C10 suppliers and lifecycle dependencies |
CLOUD + OT + ASSURANCE
Connect the delivery foundations.
GCC High / Azure Government virtualization, AVD isolation, IaC repeatability, OT / specialized-asset integration, RMF/ATO, and assessor expertise connect architecture to operating evidence. SOS also brings DIBCAC-validated environment experience; validation remains specific to the assessed environment, scope, and date.
THE EXPERTISE BEHIND THE WORKSTREAM
Bridge policy, engineering and authorization evidence.
SOS brings together security architecture, control implementation and an assessor’s attention to evidence quality. Our specialist focus is turning agreed requirements into clear responsibilities, documented safeguards and reviewable work products.
- RMF & NIST 800-53: boundary and categorization support, implementation narratives, SSP/POA&M contributions and control traceability.
- OT & specialized assets: bounded architectures, segmented zones, controlled interfaces and transfer procedures that account for equipment constraints.
- Authorization-package support: evidence organization, findings remediation and eMASS artifact support where authorized.
- Continuous monitoring: configuration and vulnerability tracking, central logging, evidence refresh and recurring review.
CMMC assessment experience informs evidence quality; it does not confer government RMF assessment or authorization authority. The system owner, prime and government define the engagement roles.
Discuss the SME role on your project ↗LET’S DEFINE THE WORKSHARE
A clear scope starts with a focused conversation.
Engage SOS for proposal support, a defined delivery workstream or specialist surge support. We’ll discuss fit, scope, dependencies and availability before committing.
Request our OT / RMF capability statement ↗